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Moore looks on the bright side of
JICPOA’s modest performance, but he
finds only one outstanding success by
its analysts during the war. Ironically, it
was in support of an amphibious operation that never occurred, the planned
invasion of Kyushu in the autumn of
1945. Because Japanese garrisons usually fought to the death and inflicted
high casualties on attacking forces, the
five hundred thousand defenders of
Kyushu were capable of turning the
opening phase of the attack on the
home islands into a bloodbath.
JICPOA’s accurate estimates of the
steady buildup of Japanese forces on
the island led military planners to support a less costly way to end the war in
the Pacific—the use of the atomic
bomb against Hiroshima and Nagasaki
in August 1945.
JAMES J. WIRTZ

Naval Postgraduate School

Lacquement, Richard A., Jr. Shaping American
Military Capabilities after the Cold War. Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2003. 211pp. $67.95

Richard Lacquement provides an important narrative history and critical
analysis of the Defense Department’s
official policy studies and reviews from
the end of the Cold War through the
early administration of George W.
Bush. The book addresses several key
themes, highlighting the scope and
speed of military reform efforts and the
failure, in the author’s view, of defense
transformation. Each chapter provides
a review, discussion, and critique of the
official documents on American defense policy and strategic thinking in
the post–Cold War decade. The book

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2005

C:\WIP\NWCR\NWC Review Autumn 2005.vp
Thursday, August 18, 2005 9:57:51 AM

155

traces the major themes and issues in
the official Defense Department policy
reviews, including the 1990 Base Force,
the 1993 Bottom-Up Review, the 1995
Commission on Roles and Missions of
the Armed Forces, and the 1997 and
2001 Quadrennial Defense Reviews.
Lacquement is an Army field artillery
officer who has served on the faculties
of the U.S. Military Academy and the
Naval War College. Shaping American
Military Capabilities after the Cold War,
his first book, is based on his Princeton
University doctoral dissertation. It is
the product of serious academic research that is informed throughout by
the sincere search of a soldier-statesman
for better ideas in the development of
the U.S. armed forces’ capabilities to
serve the nation’s current and future
security needs.
From Les Aspin, through William Perry
and William Cohen, to Donald Rumsfeld,
defense secretaries and their official
policy documents have addressed the
Defense Department’s and services’ efforts at transforming the post–Cold
War military. Lacquement’s argument
is that more change throughout the
1990s would have been better. He contrasts the influence of outsiders,
mainly political defense reformers, to
that of insiders, members of a mostly
conservative military culture and status
quo–oriented senior military leadership. Lacquement characterizes Bill
Clinton’s defense secretary, Les Aspin,
and Connecticut senator Joseph
Lieberman as champions of innovation,
while portraying the Joint Chiefs of
Staff chairmen Generals Colin Powell
and John Shalikashvili as resistant to
revolutionary new thinking on defense
issues.
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In tracing the evolution of these official
policy documents, Lacquement comes
out on the side of the glass-half-empty
view of the Defense Department’s attempts at reshaping post–Cold War
military capabilities and service organizations and programs. He argues that
major weapons programs and service
budget shares overrode sound strategic
thinking; that innovation champions
were stymied by senior officers; and
that incrementalism prevailed over
transformation. Lacquement is clearly
on the side of the proponents for more,
better, and faster defense
transformation.
Toward the end of his book, Lacquement
also raises important questions regarding the nation-building capabilities of
U.S. forces engaged in current complex
counterinsurgency operations in Iraq
and Afghanistan. For instance, he calls
for additional civil affairs and psychological operations forces. In recent military history, those nation-building
debates have gone back to the arguments over the appropriate roles and
missions of U.S. ground forces in the
war in Vietnam (Lacquement cites
Andrew Krepinevich, Jr., The Army and
Vietnam [Johns Hopkins Univ. Press,
1998], for instance). Nevertheless, his
arguments lend an element of currency
to those engaged in Iraq and Afghanistan policies regarding “postconflict”
and stability operations. The final chapter, “Evaluation and Recommendations,” introduces possibilities for
engaging in some out-of-the box thinking on winning the next war by leveraging technology and the revolution in
military affairs; supporting effective
peace operations; and fighting the
global war on terrorism while improving homeland defense. These are
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significant enough research topics for a
second book.
What this work does not provide is an
assessment of the innovations that were
attempted and in some cases executed
during the Clinton and early Bush eras.
My hunch is there were innovations at
many levels within the Defense Department, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the services, and the combatant commands
that deserve additional attention and
more research. For instance, how are
we to explain the relative successes in
the use of military capabilities to
achieve political objectives in Balkans
peacekeeping, as well as in the wars in
Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq? Would
a more thoroughly transformed military have resulted in even fewer American and civilian casualties, and better
coordinated NATO operations in
Kosovo? More effective combined,
joint, and special operations in Afghanistan; or a quicker completion of the
conventional battles in Iraq?
Lacquement’s book, carefully read,
provides critical insights into the assumptions and themes in the evolution
of the key policy and strategy documents in the decade following the end
of the Cold War. Shaping American
Military Capabilities after the Cold War
serves to inform and ground a study of
the history of major Clinton-era defense policy reviews. Gauging the size,
scope, and speed of change while retaining the readiness and military capabilities to defend against current and
emerging threats, of course, represents
an important research agenda. For all
these reasons, Shaping American Military Capabilities after the Cold War is
an important book for students of international security and American
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defense policy, and especially readers
interested in defense transformation.
JOSEPH R. CERAMI

Colonel, U.S. Army, Retired

Bell, Christopher M., and Bruce A. Elleman, eds.
Naval Mutinies of the Twentieth Century: An International Perspective. London: Frank Cass,
2003. 288pp. $125

Throughout this excellent collection of
essays on what might rightly be called
the mystique of mutiny runs a significant thread—that from centuries of
laws and regulations governing naval
conduct and discipline there has
emerged no precise or universally accepted definition of mutiny. Ambiguity
has clouded every effort to create one.
The only consistent element, despite
the number of crewmen involved and
the growth of simple disobedience into
violence, is the necessary presence of
usurpation and subversion of authority.
This is evident in what thirteen writers
contribute here, in an authoritative and
attractive style and tone. The mutinies
they have selected for study are of a
character so dramatic that no matter
how scholarly the approach and painstaking the research, each tale is likely to
intrigue the reader. Certain selections
may be familiar: the Russian battleship
Potemkin, the mass uprising that shook
the German High Seas Fleet in 1918,
Invergordon, and the Port Chicago mutiny. The authors—Robert Zebroski,
Michael Epkenhans of Germany’s Otto
von Bismarck Foundation, Christopher
M. Bell, and Regina T. Akers of the Naval Historical Center—tackle their subjects with fresh appraisal and zeal. The
bloody Potemkin revolt led to the fall of
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the Romanovs. The mutinous German
seamen sabotaged their government’s
war effort. The Invergordon mutiny
threw Great Britain off the gold standard. Thanks mostly to the NAACP’s
brilliant young lawyer, Thurgood
Marshall, the Port Chicago episode not
only struck a blow at racial discrimination but highlighted the endless debate
of what constitutes a mutiny. Also, it
should not be forgotten that President
Clinton’s pardon of Freddie Meeks in
1999 still leaves the names of forty-nine
African-Americans on record as the
only convicted mutineers in U.S. naval
history.
The lesser known mutinies are dealt
with by equally qualified experts with
comparable skill and revelation. In 1910
the fury of Brazilian sailors against brutal employment of the lash reflected
that country’s discontent. After winning minor reforms from the ruling
class, the men of the dreadnoughts
Minas Geraes and Sao Paulo continued
to show the Brazilian flag above
subequatorial waters, maintaining their
country’s reputation as South America’s leading naval power. The mutiny
in the Adriatic Sea aboard the AustroHungarian armored cruisers Sankt
George and Kaiser Karl VI in February
1918 is said to have helped bring down
the Hapsburg monarchy. Yet as the author of “The Cattaro Mutiny, 1918,”
Paul G. Halpern of Florida State University, asserts, the revolt lasted only
two days. Its causes were traceable to bad
food, boredom, and plain war-weariness.
Also mutinous, after four years of war
with Germany, were French sailors
when ordered into war against Russian
Bolsheviks. While this event is the principal focus of the essay by French history professor Philippe Masson, notice
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